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Greater Soviet Empire by Totentanz0 Greater Soviet Empire by Totentanz0
Dystopian and anachronistic map of Soviet territorial aims.

“Though, in the name of Communist solidarity and the formation of a classless society, the Soviet Union has tried its utmost to consolidate all Communist nations in one Communist super-State under its absolute control, yet national sentiment has proved too strong a force and has successfully thwarted all its efforts.”
(Basic Principles of Geopolitics and History, by Debabrata Sen)

“At the same time the state structure of Eastern Europe was perceived to be fluid. This view was not exclusively communist; the area's inter-war history had been disappointing, and in 1943 Britain had toyed with ideas of an Eastern, or at least Danubian, Federation. Stalin did not like them. But he allowed the canvassing, after the war, both of various Balkan federations and of a more ambitious extension of the Soviet Union, merging 'the Ukraine with Hungary and Rumania, and Byelorussia with Poland and Czechoslovakia, while the Balkan states were to be joined with Russia'.”
“In November 1941 Maisky had sketched a scheme for a Balkan federation centred on Yugoslavia, a federation of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and another of the Baltic states, all to lean economically and militarily on Russia (FRUS 1941, i, pp. 337-8). In 1948 Gottwald suggested to Stalin that Czechoslovakia accede to the Soviet Union (Khrushchev Remembers, iii, p. 131); and an SED leader told Wolfgang Leonhard it was quite possible, though not inevitable, that in due course all the People's Democracies would join 'as new Union Republics' (Child of the Revolution (1957) p. 403). As late as 1972 Zhivkov agreed with Brezhnev to create conditions for Bulgaria to do so, something he continued to hope for until the advent of Gorbachev (Keesing's, 37745)”
(The Cold War: The Great Powers and Their Allies, by J. P. D. Dunbabin)

“The authorities in Portugal were also firmly convinced that if the Spanish republican forces triumphed in Spain not only would Portugal go communist but it would cease to be a truly independent state because the ambitions of the Spanish left were not confined to the defence of the Spanish Republic but included the establishment of a federation of Iberian soviet republics with Portugal, possibly associated with Galicia, merely one amongst many. In such an eventuality the Portuguese colonial empire would cease to exist.45 According to the American journalist Edward Knoblaugh, the republican prime minister, Largo Caballero, was committed to Portugal's absorption into a Spanish soviet republic. Even in defeat many republicans continued to believe in the idea of a federation of Iberian states which might include Portugal.”
(The Oldest Ally: Britain and the Portuguese Connection, 1936-1941, by Glyn Stone)

“Monteiro was anxious to help but he was also clearly perturbed by reports which are reaching him of conditions in Spain. He emphasized many times over that the objective of the Left in Spain was to overrun Portugal and to establish a Iberian Soviet Republic. In these circumstances it is not surprising that Portugal was watchful and even fearful.”
(Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939)

“The "military operations" in France no doubt refer to Soviet special services' measures to support a Moscow-inspired uprising that the French Communist Party would organize to establish the Soviet Republic of France. It would start out being a fraternal state before becoming an integral part of the USSR. This crazy idea was for a short time Stalin's cherished dream during the postwar period, and he shared his thoughts about it with Maurice Thorez. Later it was discovered that this was not just idle chatter. On a tip-off from KGB Captain Oleg Lyalin, a defector to the West, two weapons dumps were found in Brittany. They were to be used by Soviet sleepers in the event of a Socialist revolution in France. Stalin had clearly dropped the plans, realizing that they were sure to fail. But whatever support Lubyanka could supply, was in place. Similar coups were being planned in Turkey and Iran where an enormous spy network was active.”
(Toxic Politics, by Arkadi Vaksberg)

“Moscow contented itself with the territorial acquisition of Transcarpathia and did not act upon the proposal of some overzealous Slovak Communists to break Slovakia away and turn it into a Soviet republic. It showed its readiness to tolerate some sort of pluralist system in Czechoslovakia dominated by the Communists, relying on the region's most Russophile or even Sovietophile populace outside of Bulgaria.”
(War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, by Vojtech Mastny,Sven S. Holtsmark,Andreas Wenger)

“Minister Molotov visited Berlin for two days of discussions. Hitler questioned his visitors to uncover Soviet intentions. Molotov indicated that Stalin wanted to annex Finland and make Bulgaria and the Dardanelles a Soviet sphere of influence.”
(World War II: A Military History, by Alan Warren)

The military operations of the first month of the Winter War on the Soviet side were under the local control of the Leningrad military district, whose strategic aim was to occupy Finland and transform it into a Soviet republic. Setting up the Kuusinen government had merely been one means to this end.
(From Grand Duchy to Modern State, by Osmo Jussila, Seppo Hentilä, Jukka Nevakivi)

“A puppet Communist government-in-waiting was established for Finland, and Stalin drew up plans to incorporate Finland into the Soviet Union as the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Republic.”
(Russia's War, by Richard Overy)

“In 1948, on the ideological plane, the Yugoslav Communists were not in principle against the incorporation of Yugoslavia into the Soviet Union ; on the practical plane they would not agree to have the security police controlled from outside.”
(Soviet survey, Congress for Cultural Freedom)

“The 'Pact', the subject of a pamphlet issued by the Greek government in June 1947 under the title The Conspiracy against Greece, was supposedly an agreement for the establishment of a Balkan Union of Soviet Republics with (Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian) Macedonia as an independent Republic within the Union, so that Bulgaria could obtain an outlet to the Aegean.”
(The British labour government and the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949, by Thanasis D. Sfikas)

“There is a phrase in a Dmitrov's diary: Stalin: We are going to put forward a proposal to the Bulgarians regarding the conclusion ofa pact on mutual aid. We are backing the territorial claims of Bulgaria, including Midiya-Enos, Eastern Thrace, Dedeagac, Drama and Kavala. We also demand a base to prevent the Turks from using the Straits against us. Should such a pact be concluded, Turkey would not dare fight against Bulgaria, and the situation in the Balkans would be different.33 Stalin suggested that Dmitrov assist in bringing this proposal to the notice of the broader strata of Bulgarian society.”
(Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953 Di Jamil Hasanl)

“A cable from the U.S. envoy Earle, for instance, read: “The secretary of the illegal Bulgarian Communist organization informs me that Sobolev asked the King for naval and air bases in Bulgaria. Russia in return offered to force Turkey to give Adrianople and Turkish Thrace to Bulgaria and to exert all possible pressure on Greece to cede Grecian Thrace. [The Secretary] says that the King has courteously but firmly refused Russia's proposals.”
(Crown of Thorns: The Reign of King Boris III of Bulgaria, 1918-1943 by Stephane Groueff)

“Stalin had sent Arkadi Sobolev, the secretary-general of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, to Sofia late in the month with an offer guaranteeing the kingdom against Turkey and promising aid in obtaining territory in Turkish Thrace.”
(The Bulgarian Jews and the Final Solution, 1940-1944, by Frederick B. Chary)

“In view of the community of interests of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, the Soviet Union repeats its proposal of September 1939 to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria, which would be helpful to Bulgaria in realizing her national aspirations not only in western (Greek) but also in eastern (Turkish) Thrace.”
(Greek-Soviet Relations, 1917-1941, by Andrew L. Zapantis)

“On November 12, 1940, in Berlin, Molotov was interrogating Hitler as to the possible German reaction in case of a Russian annexation of the Straits ; and Sobolev, the then secretary-general of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, on a visit to Sofia, was offering Turkish Thrace to Bulgaria as a price for her participation in an aggression against Turkey. Sofia refused and informed Berlin and Ankara about this offer which had, as a result, a Bulgarian-Turkish pact of non-aggression (February 17, 1941).”
(The Contemporary Review)

“… that last November, Sobolev, Secretary General of the Soviet Foreign Office, had visited Sofia on a mysterious errand which the Turkish Government learned was a proposal to enter into a pact of mutual assistance directed professedly against Turkey — a proposal which there was even some reason to believe had been gilded with an offer to assure to Bulgaria a portion of Turkish Thrace.”
(Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers)

“Sofia hardly deviated from the Soviet line in foreign policy, except intermittently over Macedonia or some other Balkan issue, and in September 1973 Zhivkov declared that Bulgaria and the Soviet Union would 'act as a single body, breathing with the same lungs and nourished by the same blood stream'. He made a second attempt, the first having been a decade previously, to incorporate Bulgaria into the USSR. “
(Eastern Europe in the 20th Century, by R. J. Crampton)

More interesting were reports regarding the future incorporation of Rumania and Bulgaria into the USSR. They began to appear during the early summer of 1948. The Kremlin supposedly exerted considerable pressure at this time to have the Rumanians conduct a plebiscite by which the people would express their overwhelming desire to become a Soviet Republic within the USSR. After the Rumanian plebiscite, Bulgaria would similarly express a spontaneous desire to become a member of the Soviet Union. The Soviets would thus gain a common border with Greece and European Turkey and would realize an historic aspiration of Russian foreign policy. Reports of this plan of incorporation were said to have been carefully checked and confirmed. The organ of the Cominform in Bucharest, moreover, did not deny these May reports until the following September.
(Soviet imperialism: Russia's drive toward world domination, by Ernest Day Carman)

“With respect to territorial integrity, it was the Soviet attempt at the end of World War Two to incorporate parts of north-eastern Turkey into the Soviet Union that facilitated the abandoning of Ataturk's foreign policy principle of 'non-alignment' by his follower Ismet Inonu.”
(The Greek-Turkish conflict in the 1990s, by Dimitri Constas)

“In June 1945 Molotov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, formally presented a demand to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow for the surrender of three Anatolian provinces, which were supposed to have belonged to Georgia (Kars, Ardahan and Artvin). Since Moscow was also preparing to support Armenian claims to several other Anatolian provinces, war against Turkey — or at least action in North-Eastern Turkey — seemed possible, and Stalin wanted to clear the strategic Georgian-Turkish border of a Muslim population likely to be hostile to Soviet intentions. The removal of several small and harmless nationalities was a simple safety device in an offensive plan against a neutral neighbour (a plan which was to be abandoned in June 1953 when Molotov renounced both Armenian and Georgian claims to Turkish border areas).”
(The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, by Alexandre Bennigsen, Marie Broxup)

“It appears that when in June 1945, one month after the close of the war in Europe, the Turks approached the Soviet government for a new treaty of alliance, they were informed that this was conditional on the establishment of a new regime for the Straits, and also on the return to Russia of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan, which she had voluntarily restored to Turkey in 1921; apparently she now hoped to find oil there. At his speech at Fulton (Missouri) in March 1946 Mr. Churchill disclosed that at the Potsdam Conference the U.S.A. and Britain offered Russia a joint guarantee of the complete freedom of the Straits in peace and war; 'but we were told that this was not enough. Russia must have a fortress inside the Straits from which she could dominate Istanbul'. In the months that followed, Armenians, both within the Soviet Republic of Armenia and in other parts of the world, were encouraged to make propaganda for the return to Russia of Kars and Ardahan. In December 1945 the Soviet press and radio gave wide publicity to the claim put forward by Georgian professors to a coastal belt of north-eastern Turkey some 180 miles in length, on the grounds that this had been Georgian territory 2,000years ago.”
(A Short History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, by George Eden Kirk)

“The territory of Wilsonian Armenia would not extend as far as that claimed by the Armenian Nationalists at the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War, but it would add to the Soviet Union (Armenian S.S.R.) an important territory which would include, besides the officially demanded Kars region, parts of the Turkish vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis (Mus), and Trebzon. Other historical plans for the restoration of Great Armenia would certainly revive as soon as the reshuffling of Eastern Turkey started. Early in 1914, an agreement was reached between Russia and Turkey concerning a large area (109,000 square miles), in which Russia was to assume the protection of the Armenians. In lyiy, the National Armenian Delegation in Paris presented the most extensive plan of a Great Armenia, stretching from the Russian borders on the Black Sea to the Mediterranean ports of Adana and Alexandrette. The weak point in all these programmes is that at present the number of Armenians in these areas is extremely small. They were of course done away with by cruel and inhumane means. For three decades now the regions have been inhabited by Turks, whose annexation to the Soviet Union would mean not the creation of a Great Armenia but the emergence of a new national minority within the Soviet Union or the creation of a small Turkish Soviet Republic. A number of Armenian organisations abroad, especially in Egypt and the United States, are actively at work in favour of this " Great Armenian " programme ; the Soviet Government is ready to grant facilities for emigrants to return to their " new homes.”
“ When the Soviet-Turkish conflict developed in 1945 and the Turkish Government made it clear that it would resist on both the Dardanelles and Kars issues, the Soviet Government augmented its pressure to advance a programme of territorial reshuffling which, were it realised, would mean a far greater loss to Turkey than the cession of the Kars region. As the Conference of Foreign Ministers was about to begin in Moscow, on December 14, 1945, the Kommunist, published in Tiflis, capital of Soviet Georgia, printed a long and detailed letter by two Georgian scholars. The letter, obviously written upon instructions from Moscow, was immediately reprinted by all the leading Soviet newspapers. In this letter, entitled About Our Legitimate Claims Against Turkey, Messrs. Zhanasha and Bendzenishvili recalled the fact that centuries ago a Georgian State had embraced the south-eastern shore of the Black Sea, occupying a large area later conquered by the Turks. Therefore, the authors demanded the restitution to Soviet Georgia of the Turkish provinces of Ardahan, Olta, Tortun, Ispir, Baiburt, Giimushaneh, and Eastern Lizistan, including Trabzon and Giresun. This territory, they said, " is just a part of the areas forcibly detached from Georgia." The weakness of this argumentation was obvious particularly in Russia, where " historical claims " of this kind were ridiculed for decades after the Revolution, and where demands based on mere historical reminiscences were known to have been raised by Mussolini in regard to the Caucasus, by Hitler, by Rumania, and so forth. But there was no other way to justify the new demands ; it was impossible to avow that the Government of the Russian Empire had intended to annex the very same territories and had even reached an agreement in regard to them with its Allies in the First World War.”
(Free Europe)

“Many academic and U.S. intelligence specialists concur in the belief that Russia's long-term solution is the absorption of Afghanistan into the Soviet Union as a Soviet Socialist Republic.76 In fact, Soviet policy under Brezhnev and Andropev has been a direct continuation of Russia's strategy in Central Asia devised over a century ago called, "Russification," but in the Soviet era termed, "sovietization.”
(The Soviet Union in the third world)

Department of State, Special Report no. 106, December.) More ominous, Lt. Gen. Ghulam Siddiq Miraki, the deputy chief of KHAD who defected to Pakistan, claimed to have access to information on a Soviet plan to annex all of Afghanistan. The plan was allegedly abandoned after after Babrak failed to achieve a PDPA consensus that would have allowed him to petition for more Soviet troops and admission into the USSR, but an alternative plan for the Soviet Union to annex at least the nine northern Afghan provinces was supposedly still under consideration as of Brezhnev's death in November. (AP, 16 December.) Later articles in the official press extolling the benefits of union republic membership in the USSR may have been connected in some way with this allegation (Kabul New Times, 25 December). Meanwhile, there were continued reports that the USSR had all but annexed the Wakhan Corridor, the finger of Afghan territory extending to the Chinese border in the northeast (NYT, 8 December). Nevertheless, there were incentives for
(Yearbook on international communist affairs )

“In fact, the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979 for two geopolitical objectives. To incorporate Afghanistan into the USSR, just as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and other countries had already been, and To expand the Soviet Union's borders to the south to reach through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean and to the oil rich countries in the Persian Gulf region.”
(The Truth of Terrorism, by Akhtar Kassimyar)

“The foreign pres's had reported that the Soviet Union planned to annex Wakhan and that its troops would not be withdrawn from there.”
(Pakistan Year Book)

"The Soviet thrust into Afghanistan in 1 979 and the apparent intention to annex the Wakhan territory effectively sealed off the only border between Afghanistan and China. Moreover, control of the Wakhan provided the Soviet Union with a common border with Kashmir. It also presented Pakistan with a new neighbor in its sensitive northwest frontier region."
(The Middle East: a political dictionary, by Lawrence Ziring)

“The Soviet withdrawal offer contains some significant small print. Most important, the Kremlin says it will continue to occupy, and possibly even annex, the Wakhan Strip in north eastern most Afghanistan, a zone that borders China, Pakistan and the Soviet Union. As the Pakistanis are all too aware that would give them a frontier with the Soviet Union.”
(Afkār Inquiry)

So far as can be determined, Moscow's eventual goal is the absorption of Iran into the U.S.S.R. A number of moves within Iran since World War II illustrate Soviet policy.
(Iran: oasis of stabiity in Middle East?, by Donald Newton Wilber)

“Ever since the spring of 1942, press reports, alleged to have emanated from Moscow, circulated a story to the effect that Russia would advocate the establishment of an independent Soviet Republic of Manchuria and also of Korea. Many rumors of a similar nature have ben going the rounds every now and then until many well informed people in this country are of the opinion that it has become an open secret. During the San Francisco Conference the existence of a secret understanding was disclosed through a highly reliable source. This arrangement was made at Yalta between our late President, the British Prime Minister, and the Soviet Premier to the effect that Korea and Manchuria would be within the orbit of Russian influence and that the United States and Great Britain shall remain noncommittal to Korea until after the defeat of Japan. The report of this discovery was published in the press, and the oflicials of our State Department in San Francisco and Washington at once denied the truth of the report.”
(Congressional Record)

“While the Soviet Union's objective was to incorporate Sinkiang into the territory of the USSR or to make it a satellite like Outer Mongolia, the aim of the Chinese Communists was to keep it under China's sovereignty and to make it a base of socialist industrialization.”
(Sinkiang: pawn or pivot?, by Allen Suess Whiting, Shicai Sheng)

“A. Larin's conclusions about Stalin's geopolitical calculations appear entirely justified, since in 1945 no one could precisely predict how events in China would unfold, and how the opposition between the CPC and the Kuomintang would develop. In particular, Moscow did not exclude the possibility of creating a buffer state on the territory of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang headed by the CPC and under Soviet control as a counterbalance to Kuomintang China, behind which the US stood. In December 1945, Chiang Kai-shek again sent Chiang Ching- kuo to Moscow to meet Stalin.”
(Far Eastern Affairs)

“In his National Press Club speech of January, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that Russia is engaged in "detaching" from China and "attaching" to Russia the northern areas of China. "This process," said Mr. Acheson, "is completed in Outer Mongolia. It is nearly completed in Manchuria." He went on to include Inner Mongolia and Sin- kiang, and to say that "this fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact in the relations of any foreign power with Asia.”
(Owen Lattimore & Loss, by Robert P. Newman)

“The main item of Kovalev's account revolves round an alleged incident in July 1949 when Gao was a member of a secret Chinese mission, headed by Liu Shaoqi, sent to Moscow to conduct talks with Stalin. During a meeting of the delegation with the Soviet leadership, Gao is said to have called for Manchuria to become the seventeenth republic of the USSR; reportedly he also made other suggestions which seemed intended to bring Moscow into Chinese affairs as a bulwark against potential American actions. Kovalev reports that Stalin wisely poured scorn on Gao and his proposal. This is a pretty outlandish story, to Khrushchev, for example, was aware that some Chinese thought of Gao as Moscow's man: see Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, vol. 2, ed. S. Talbott (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p.”
(Mao's conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, 1953-55, by Paul Wingrove)

“Despite his own promises to support Chiang's claims to Hong Kong, Stalin covertly supported British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. He himself planned to incorporate substantial additional territories, including parts of Northeastern China, into the Soviet Union, and so was reluctant to support Chinese demands for the reunification of all Chinese lands.”
(Where Empires Collided, by Michael B. Share)

“In September 1939, Chiang received intelligence reports of a plan reportedly given to Wang Jingwei's pro- Japanese group by Japanese military headquarters and proposing a partition of China into Soviet and Japanese spheres of influence. Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and China's northwest were to be a part of the Soviet sphere.31 Chiang also received reports from China's embassies in Washington and London of newspaper accounts that Soviet- Japanese discussions of a nonaggression treaty were already under way. Such reports sometimes asserted that mutual Japanese-Soviet recognition of spheres of influence in China was to be one component of this treaty.”
(Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945, by John W. Garver)

“The Stalin—Hitler Pact opened up the prospect that Stalin might do a similar deal with japan, with China a second Poland. Indeed, at this very moment, the Kremlin signed a ceasefire with Japan, bringing to a halt fighting that had been going on between the Soviet Red Army and the Japanese on the border of Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo. The Poland scenario caused Chiang Kai-shek acute concern, which he raised with Moscow. Mao's reaction, however, was one of delight. His whole strategy for the war with japan was aimed at prevailing on Russia to step in. Now a real chance appeared that Stalin might occupy part of China, and put Mao in charge. In late September that year, when Edgar Snow asked Mao how he felt about a Soviet—japanese pact, Mao's reply was enthusiastic. He said that Russia might sign such a pact 'as long as this does not hinder its support for . . . the interest of the world liberation movement [i.e., Mao himself and the CCP]'. Asked whether 'Soviet help to China's liberation movement may take a somewhat similar form' to Russian occupation of Poland, Mao gave a very positive reply: 'it is quite within the possibilities of Leninism'. The Poland scenario was now Mao's model for China.”
“Again, Mao was hoping that Russia would partition China with japan. Mao even had an ideal demarcation line, the Yangtze, which flows across the middle of China. To his inner circle, Mao dreamed of 'drawing a border . . . at the Yangtze. with us ruling one half . . .' Replicating the Poland scenario was indeed at the front of Stalin's mind, and Russia began talks with japan in September 1939, right after the signing of the Nazi—Soviet Pact, with the future of China very much at the centre of the negotiations.”
“The terms Japan offered on China did not begin to match Stalin's expectations. Tokyo would agree only to “a Russian sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang,” which was hardly alluring to Stalin, as these two places were already in his pocket. japan also considered 'recognising and accepting the three northwestern provinces (Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia) remaining a Chinese Communist base' - on condition that Russia agreed to 'restrain the anti—japanese activities of the Chinese Communists'. But this idea was again not nearly enough for Stalin, as the CCP was already occupying a much larger territory than these three provinces. Moscow's failure to strike a deal with Tokyo meant that Stalin's priority remained staving off the possibility of a japanese attack on Russia — and that meant Mao could not have his all—out war on Chiang yet. Stalin wanted a united China which could continue to bog down the japanese.”
(Mao: The Unknown Story, by Jung Chang, ‎Jon Halliday)

“Stalin and his associates initially assumed that their principal relationship would be with Nationalist China in the post- 1945 years. In a very real sense, they pursued a "two Chinas" policy in the early period after the war, being careful to keep official relations with the Nationalist government correct, but at the same time, providing sanctuary and assistance to the Communists in Manchuria, which they briefly occupied. Even after significant Communist military victories, Stalin assumed (and perhaps wanted) a China that would be divided roughly at the Yangtze River, with the Communists to the north, the Nationalists to the south. It is also true that Mao Zedong was not Stalin's favorite Communist. Stalin regarded Mao with suspicion, both with respect to his understanding of Marxism, and more importantly, with respect to his attitude toward the Soviet Union. But the Russians realized that after the early 1940s at least, there were no viable alternatives within the movement. To Stalin, it was vitally important to ensure that the Soviet Union would never again be threatened with a two-front war. Thus, as a buffer-state system was being constructed to the West, it was essential to see Japan eliminated as a future menace, Korea — or at least a portion — absorbed ideologically, and China (or several Chinas) cultivated by whatever means necessary.”
(East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, by Sheldon W. Simon)

“Mao Tse-tung. who had been instructed to oppose Japanese aggression. went so far in reverse as to see the advantages of Stalin concluding a nonaggression pact with Japan that would divide China. Mao wanted a "Polish solution" for his country. His thinking was that the Soviets would make him head of a puppet govermnent.and he was ready to consign hall the country to the Japanese occupation. In September 1939. Mao was prepared to collaborate with the Japanese. hoping that at the very least they would strike down his nationalist enemies.”
(Lenin, Stalin and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe, by Robert Gellately)

“We can thus confidently assume that the stage had been set for a strategic partnership between Moscow and the CCP by the beginning of 1949. It is nonetheless easily conceivable that Stalin would have preferred to deal in the future with a China in two parts. Truman was even convinced that the Soviet Union would have preferred a divided and weak Chinese neighbor to a united China under a dynamic Communist leadership.266 The idea of a Communist North Chinese buffer state that was dependent on the USSR between the USSR and an American protectorate in a KMT-led South China would have been attractive to Moscow from the perspective of security. This state, could in turn, have been divided into two security zones: the first would include Manchuria, with an increased Soviet influence along the lines of a traditional sphere of influence; and the second, the area from the Great Wall to the e Yangtze line. Tensions between these two Chinas would have put Moscow in a position to exploit them to its own advantage. A unified China under a Mao Zedong, who had repeatedly demonstrated his unwillingness to be subservient to Moscow, must have seemed less attractive in comparison.”
(The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950, by Dieter Heinzig)

“The resultant memorandum speculated that the Soviet Union would have two options in expanding its influence in postwar Northeast Asia. Moscow might either encourage the Chinese Communists to set up a soviet republic in Manchuria or use Mongolian nationalism to create a Soviet–Mongolian bloc. According to British officials, the latter option had the advantage of using the nationality principle and therefore appearing less disturbing to the Anglo -American opinion. In following the second option, the Soviets would encourage Japanese-trained Mongolian armed forces and political groups in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to join with Outer Mongolia in a strong movement for unifying all Mongols in a single state, or a “Greater Mongolia.”
(Recast All under Heaven, by Xiaoyuan Liu)

“During the first few months of the party's postwar growth some Communist leaders demanded outright incorporation of Korea into the Soviet Union. This line was soon dropped in order not to make difficult the more immediate task of reunion with South Korea.”
(Soviet Russia and the Far East, by David J. Dallin)

“After this request was refused, Japanese Communists on Hokkaido, of whom there are still about 40,000, tried to transform Hokkaido into an independent Soviet republic — or one at any rate independent from the rest of Japan. The Communists had no hope of succeeding, partly because of the presence of American forces in Hokkaido, and also because many people in Hokkaido were refugees from the Kurils and south Sakhalin, having been driven out of those places by the Russians. But the Communists are still around, and the Russians are too close for comfort.”
(The heart of Japan, by Alexander Campbell)

“In his confidential letter of August 16th, 1945, however, Stalin proposed two amendments to the General Order No. 1. One was to include the Kurile Islands in the Russian section for the surrender of the Japanese Army. The other was to divide Hokkaido into two portions on the line leading from the city of Kushiro on the eastern coast to the city of Rumoi on the Western coast, including the two named cities, and that the northern half of it should be assigned to the Russian occupation. In his reply of August 18th, Truman refused to assign the northern half of Hokkaido to the Soviet occupation, while agreeing to Stalin's request to modify the Order to include all the Kurile Island to be assigned to the Soviet commander, upon the condition that the United States Government would be given air base on the central Kuriles for military and commercial purposes.”
(The Japan Annual of International Affairs)

“Plan to Divide Japan It is reported that there was a plan to divide Japan, after it was defeated in World War II, into five parts and have the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China govern the parts. If the plan had been realized, Japan would doubtless have become a very different country from what it is now. It is said that the plan was discovered by Makoto lokibe, lecturer at Hiroshima University, from material is which was released to the public for the first tune this summer at the National Archives in Washington. According to this plan, the Soviet Union was to govern Hokkaido and the Tohoku area, the United States the Kanto and Chubu areas, China and the United States 20 the Kinki area, China the Shikoku area and Britain the Kyushu and Chugoku areas.”
(天声人語)

“Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, made plans to form a "West African Soviet Republic" and frequently cited the applicability of the Soviet multinational structure to Africa.”
(Soviet strategy in Southern Africa: Gorbachev's pragmatic approach, by Peter Vanneman)

16 Feb.— Gold Coast. Dr Nkrumah, leader of the Convention People's Party, said in evidence at his trial that when in England he had made plans to establish a 'West African Soviet Republic', including the Gold Coast.
(Chronology of international events and documents, Royal Institute of International Affairs)

“His ambitions reached comic heights when in response to a description of a 1946 army base in the Far East designed as a launch pad for an invasion of the United States he mentioned that he "wouldn't mind getting Alaska back," but that the "time hadn't arrived for such tasks" (Chuev 1991: 71 ).”
(Trust And Mistrust In International Relations, by Andrew H. Kydd)

For years, ignoring Norway's sovereign rights, the Soviet Union had been playing the bully and trying to annex the Svalbard Islands under the signboard of "opening up resources."
(Daily report: People's Republic of China, by United States. Foreign Broadcast Information Service)

“The final consequence was the secret war as we know it today and as we have known it since V.E. Day 1945. A new plan was drawn up, probably some time in the autumn of 1941. Denmark was to be occupied by the Red Army, which would bring Norway into the Soviet zone of influence. The occupation of Bornholm would be the key to the Baltic. Greece was to be captured from within, with the EAM/ELAS forces as the spearhead of the coup d'etat. With Tito as the partisan leader the collaboration of Jugoslavia would be secured.”
(Pattern for Conquest, by John Baker White)

“On the contrary, it appeared that the Soviets were making plans to stay on for an indefinite period.11 Kai Myring, a New York Times correspondent, visited the island in the latter part of May 1945, a few days after the Soviet occupation commenced. Although he spent the first few hours of his stay being questioned by Red Army officials, Myring managed to spend three days on Bornholm before returning by boat to Sweden. He reported that Soviet influence was predominant and that the Red Army, from all appearances, was making preparations for a protracted stay. The Soviet soldiers, he said, were already referring to the island as "Russian Denmark."”
“Russian occupation had been fore- shadowed as early as April 1945 when the Moscow radio announced that the Red Army intended to occupy points in Denmark. A possible explanation of this move and others like it appeared in a Pravda dispatch transmitted to Paris on May 27, 1945. "The Soviet Union," it proclaimed, "is a great democratic power capable of assuring the security not only of its own frontiers but also of the peoples of Europe, and the sooner this is recognized the better it will be for humanity." 14 Almost a year later, the Moscow New Times of April 1, 1946, stated that the Soviet withdrawal had caught the reactionary slanderers unawares, especially those who had accused the Soviet Union of converting Born- holm into a "Russian Malta in the Baltic".”
“The Narkomindel evidently started negotiations with the Chinese Government shortly after the conclusion of the Crimea Conference in February 1945. Its demands, however, extended considerably beyond the terms agreed upon in the Yalta. Unconfirmed reports that the Soviet Union had bid for the huge Chinese island of Formosa appeared in the New York Times on May 11, 1945. This was supposedly in addition to Soviet proposals for Red Army occupation of Manchuria, and a protectorate over Korea.1 By the time of Potsdam in July 1945, James F. Byrnes, then U.S. Secretary of State, had received a report that the USSR had brought increased pressure on the Chinese to accept excessive Russian territorial demands.2”
(Soviet Territorial Aggrandizement, 1939-1948, by Ernest Day Carman)

“For Maisky, the postwar settlement was to guarantee Soviet security both in Europe and in Asia for long enough to build such strength "that no power or combination of powers . . . could even think of aggression" there. It would be necessary for Europe, or at least continental Europe, to become Socialist, "thereby excluding the possibility of wars occurring in this part of the world." The military buildup would take about ten years after the war and full Socialization thirty to fifty years. With Germany defeated, France was potentially the only rival military power on the Continent. Maisky advised that any French revival be blocked.39 Thus at Yalta, Stalin opposed giving the French an occupation zone in Germany; he joked that France should be nothing more than a holiday resort.”
“Stalin's naval ambitions showed in late-war attempts to gain bases in both northern Norway (lying on the route from his naval bases to the Atlantic) and on the Danish island of Bornholm, which blocked the exits from the Baltic. In 1944-45 Soviet troops advancing to occupy Petsamo went on to occupy the northern tip of Norway. In November 1944 the Soviets asked the Norwegian government for base rights on Bear Island and on Svalbard (Spitzbergen), an archipelago off the northern Norwegian coast where they already operated mines. The next April the Norwegians offered to agree that the defense of Svalbard was a joint Soviet-Norwegian responsibility. The Soviet Foreign Ministry thought they were accepting the idea that Soviet bases would balance a British attempt to gain bases and thus to "Portugalize" Norway. By July 1945, the Soviet General Staff was urging at the least a twenty-five- to thirty-year lease on the Varanger area of Norway. In March 1945 the deputy Soviet ambassador to Sweden suggested seizing Bornholm. After considerable discussion, on 4 May the Baltic Fleet was ordered to seize it. As ordered, the local Soviet commander told the Danes that his presence was temporary, pending settlement of military questions relating to Germany.”
(The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War, by Norman Friedman)

“Norwegian newspapers have already noticed the sensational parts of the publication, namely the Soviet proposals regarding continental Norway soon after the end of the hostilities in Europe (doc. 274 a.o.). Whereas the Soviet proposals to Norway from November 1944 regarding a revision of the Spitsbergen convention of 1920 and a Soviet-Norwegian condominium in the archipelago (as well as the Bear Island) have been known, the other desires of subordinate Soviet civil and military bureaucracy have remained inside the Russian cabinets and are now made public for the first time. The essence of the proposals was the following: the advance of Soviet troops from northeastern to northwestern Norway as far as to Narvik (doc. 274); a formal great powers' tripartite veto upon a possible alliance (block) between the Nordic countries (N 275); a joint Soviet- Norwegian defence of continental northern Norway, empowering the USSR to build its naval and air bases in Kirkenes, Vardoe, Vad- soe and as far as in Tromsoe; later a correction of the continental border would have been undertaken (N 276). Simultaneously, the Soviet general staff extended its desiderata to embrace the Varanger peninsula and the Varanger fjord (N 277); the claims regarding Spitsbergen were to be supported by a Soviet naval expedition and the installation of a permanent garrison as well as of a naval base there without waiting for a formal revision of the 1920 convention (N 278). Almost all of these proposals were put before the Soviet leaders in June and July 1945. Afterwards, as far as the reviewed book shows, only the Soviet general staff persisted (as late as until April, 1947) in its proposal regarding a base on Spitsbergen (N 295). The lack of higher level Kremlin papers forbids us to explain both the rise and the fall of this peculiar Soviet expansionism in the North Atlantic.”
(Finnish Review of East European Studies)

“In inplement- ing its plans in the Antarctic the USSR has in effect openly embarked upon a policy of expansion. Soviet legal scholars have begun to discuss the principle of "effective occupation" of these territories which have not yet been annexed. The Soviet standpoint, that Antarctica was discovered by Russians and is therefore Russian, could lead to serious international complications.”
(Military Power and National Objectives, Army Library (U.S.)
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:iconjordanlyod1webster:
How did america loose ALL THESE COUNTRIES , them poor soviets deserved to win the Cold War
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:iconostendfaxpest:
ostendfaxpest Apr 9, 2014  New member
Red dreams? Actually we start smal with the Krim and Donezk.
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:iconbcollins39302:
bcollins39302 Mar 5, 2014  Student Digital Artist
Hmmm one thing I don't understand, why would we ceed Alaska to the Soviets? That was in no way contested (between the US and USSR) in the land sharing and whatnot at the end of WWII.
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:iconskinny22:
Skinny22 Feb 2, 2014  Hobbyist Traditional Artist
Italy should be communist!
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:iconleemys2004:
Former North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung actually planned to became leader of 'Koreya SSR' or something like incorporation of Korea into USSR, when he conquers the south. For Tsushima, it was claimed by South Korean president Syngman Rhee, which was refused by U.S government.
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:icontotentanz0:
I didn't know that Kim Il-Sung wanted to be the leader of a "Koreya SSR"! I actually struggled a bit to be able to include Korea into the USSR. I'm aware that South Korea had/has claims on Tsushima but I would need a North Korean claim to include it in this map.
I've always thought that North Korea would have been a perfect subject for a map but at the moment I'm not aware of any substantial territorial claim (besides the very substantial one against South Korea!).
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:iconamongthesatanic:
AmongTheSatanic Dec 2, 2013  Hobbyist Artist
I wonder, did you first make this on a world map template before 'cutting' it out? Does that draft file still exist?
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:icontotentanz0:
Yes. I have some early "beta maps" like that. In general I keep a lot of beta maps: I have twelve of them for my main "Nazi victory map". I'm considering the possibility of replacing this map with a normal "world map".
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:iconamongthesatanic:
AmongTheSatanic Dec 4, 2013  Hobbyist Artist
I don't know what anyone else thinks, but I love the details you put into your map series, and I think it'd be cool to see the raw templates ion your Scraps or something :)

Plus, they are rather helpful when making alternate-history maps... even though right now I'm trying to find Condotierro's old 1914 world map, which I think he removed :(
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:icontotentanz0:
I think I'd be too ashamed to post beta/unfinished pictures!
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